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§1 INTRODUCTION
In the Hebrew Scriptures, several of the consequences for disobedience to God are 
familiar—destruction of holy sites, slavery, exile from the land, and death. However, there is 
a particular consequence that is less familiar to casual readers and of special interest in this 
paper. Disobedience to God sometimes, though not always, results in stark, devastating 
reversals in God’s very relationship and experiential availability to the people whom God 
otherwise purportedly favors (e.g., in the sense of election). 
This is a curious form of punishment that not only threatens the very spiritual identity 
of the victims of the reversal, but—at least for a time—cuts off their only plausible route to 
experience of and reconciliation with God. 
This paper examines the category of divine reversal in the Hebrew Scriptures (and its 
continuation in the New Testament) and suggests some applications for understanding the 
contemporary relationship between social and religious groups and God, in particular as these 
relationships involve moral problems. I use two main examples: first, the relationship between 
the Jewish people and Eretz Yisrael [Land of Israel]; and second, the relationship between the 
Church, gender, and sexuality. These are highly contentious topics, but that is why I have 
selected them. For purposes of illustration and argument, it is essential that I assume that the 
conservative wings of the Synagogue and the Church are correct in their positions on these 
 topics. This assumption is crucial, because one main aim of my reflection is to show that even 
if such positions are theologically or morally correct in the abstract, this does not settle the 
question of how God will relate to the issues and groups in question. 
Sometimes, the justification for these divine reversals is precisely the relational effects 
that the injustices have on the victim groups’ own actual and potential relationship to God. 
Whether and how the victims of the self-identified people of God will themselves experience 
God is imperiled by the injustices that they endure. As the Apostle Paul adapts the Hebrew 
Scriptures in his letter to the congregation in Rome, “The name of God is blasphemed among 
the Gentiles because of you” (Romans 2:24; cf. Isaiah 52:5). Moreover, some of Jesus’ own 
harshest words are reserved for anyone who is responsible for what otherwise would be 
considered the failings of others: “It would be better for you if a millstone were hung around 
your neck and you were thrown into the sea” (Luke 17:2). 
To spoil the ending, insofar as the self-identified people of God commit positive 
injustices against others, and even insofar as they are culpable for failing to prevent such 
injustices from occurring, devotees of the Hebrew Scriptures—so, devout Jews and Christians 
alike—ought to take seriously the possibility that God will, in ways that might seem shocking 
and offensive, side with those who suffer the injustices and even, in a sense, sanctify their 
practices. Such divine reversals pose a special problem for Jewish and Christian ethics, which 
must grapple with the possibility that God will seem, from the point of view of the Synagogue 
or Church, to adopt inconsistent moral positions across time. The phenomenon of divine 
reversal generally complicates our understanding of the relationship between the will of God 
and Jewish/Christian ethics. 
 
§2 THREE KINDS OF DIVINE REVERSAL 
 It is worth setting aside certain kinds of reversal that are not of interest to me in this 
paper. First, consider the reversal characteristic of a change of mind. Perhaps the most famous 
(for some, notorious) instance of an apparent divine change of mind in the Hebrew Scriptures 
is in Genesis. 
The LORD saw how great was man’s wickedness on earth, and how every plan devised by his mind was 
nothing but evil all the time. And the LORD regretted that He had made man on earth, and His heart 
was saddened. The LORD said, “I will blot out from the earth the men whom I created—men together 
with beasts, creeping things, and birds of the sky; for I regret that I made them” (6:5-7). 
 
Although regret is a kind of reversal, it is not what I have in mind here. In regret, there is a 
change of belief or attitude, a wishing that one had not done something. 
A second kind of reversal is the violation of human expectations. In both the Hebrew 
Scriptures and the New Testament, there is a prominent theme of tension between divine and 
human values. This is a kind of reversal—human beings expect that p, but God asserts or 
makes it the case that ~p—but it is, once again, not what I have in mind in this paper. 
Both of these kinds of reversal overlap but are not identical to divine reversal in the 
sense of this paper. The sort of reversal I have in mind is a non-regretful reversal of God’s 
own commitments and pronouncements, but especially as they pertain to God’s relationship 
with God’s ostensibly chosen people. A few salient passages can illustrate what I have in mind 
when I talk about reversals in God’s relationships. On the one hand, a Pslamist writes, “For 
the LORD will not forsake his people; He will not abandon His very own” (Psalm 94:14). Yet, 
God declares in the prophet Amos that, due to their transgressions, the same people “shall 
wander from sea to sea and from north to east to seek the word of the LORD, but they shall 
not find it” (Amos 8:12). Such reversals sometimes go in the other direction, extending to 
groups that are otherwise enemies of God’s chosen people. Babylon, for example, is 
sometimes favored for divine purposes, so much so that its own actions are identified with 
divine action. “I will strengthen the arms of the king of Babylon and put My sword in his 
 hand,” God declares in Ezekiel 30:24. In Jeremiah 21:5, in response to a plea from Jerusalem for 
divine help, God promises instead to “battle against [Jerusalem] with an outstretched mighty 
arm,” implicitly identifying God’s arm with the forces of Babylon, which would lay siege to 
the city. 
To understand the potential offense of this kind of reversal for those who self-identify 
as belonging to God, we must contemplate what it would be like for synagogues or churches 
to be told that they are—at least for a time—not God’s people; that even were they to seek 
out God’s presence in earnest, God would not respond to them; and that the successes, 
oftentimes violent, of the groups that they perceive to be enemies are actually actions of their 
God. 
Part of what is interesting about divine reversals is that they seem to involve God 
acting or speaking in ways that are contrary to what would prima facie make sense, given other 
things that God has done or done. Given God’s promises to never forsake Israel, for example, 
it would prima facie make sense that, even when Israel commits injustices, God would patiently 
remain with Israel—and, certainly, would still respond to those who “seek the word of the 
LORD.” Given that Israel and not Babylon is God’s chosen nation, it would prima facie make 
sense for God to defend Israel from Babylon—and, certainly, to do so when Israel cries for 
God’s help. 
§3 TWO EXAMPLES 
3.1 The Jewish people and Eretz Yisrael 
The term “Zionism” is a matter of considerable controversy in contemporary politics, 
and so it is necessary to spend a moment clarifying how I will be using the term. “Zionism” is 
probably most commonly used to refer to a distinctly nationalistic and even secular ideology, 
whose core tenants involve the establishment and maintenance of a recognizably Jewish state 
 on largely political and humanistic grounds. However, I will be using “Zionism” in the sense 
of the distinctly religious Zionism that involves the combination of Orthodox Judaism with the 
basic commitments of a more secular Zionism. Religious Zionism says, in essence, that the 
land that currently constitutes the nation-state of Israel is part of what was promised to the 
Jewish people by God (Eretz Yisrael), and, crucially, that it is rightfully theirs on this basis. Even 
if the other political and moral arguments for Zionism were not cogent, God’s promises would 
still, on this view, be sufficient grounds for the Zionist project. One of the main differences 
between secular and religious Zionism, then, has to do with the justifications given for the 
core view. But there are significant differences in practical upshot as well. For instance, a 
religious Zionist will, for obvious reasons, be considerably more likely to advocate for 
explicitly expansionist national ambitions, on the grounds of the Biblical texts foundational to 
the view. 
Whatever one thinks about the plausibility of religious Zionism, it is natural to think 
that the central question about it is or would be over the factual question: does God really promise 
Eretz Israel to the Jewish people?  
Although it is natural to think that this is the central question for anyone wondering 
about religious Zionism, it is worth asking why this is so. It seems to me that the naturalness 
of the question stems from the fact that if God really does promise Eretz Israel to the Jewish 
people, then this is morally significant for us here and now. The moral significance can be 
easily seen by reflecting on God’s nature. If God is both omniscient and necessarily good, then 
if God approvingly promises that x shall belong to S, it would seem to follow that it would be 
good for S to possess x. More vividly, suppose you are arguing with someone over whether 
some bit of property is yours or theirs, and they demonstrably show that God has declared 
that it is theirs (perhaps by successfully beckoning God’s voice, or by producing a compelling 
 passage from a text you both recognize as authoritative). Putting it mildly, your opponent has 
produced very good evidence for their claim.1 
Here is where the sort of divine reversal prominent in the Hebrew Scriptures 
complicates matters. The fact that God has in some sense delivered Eretz Israel to the Jewish 
people is in fact not a sufficient condition for their rightful possession of it.2 Those living in 
fidelity to the Jewish tradition must regard it as possible that God may (temporarily) reverse 
fulfillment even of God’s most central promises: this certainly includes the promise of land. 
In the Hebrew Scriptures, when God’s people do not meet certain conditions, God seems to 
allow the very thing promised (the land) to be taken away. Interestingly, this is never taken to 
mean that God’s promises are no longer true; it suggests, rather, that God’s promises are 
reliable yet somehow conditional. So, it can simultaneously be the case that God promises x to S 
and God takes x away from S. It can even be the case that God gives x to S*, where S and S* are 
different groups of people (e.g., Israel and Babylon). 
This has dramatic consequences for religious debates over the Israel-Palestine conflict. 
Suppose two interlocutors are debating the question whether Israel has a right to this or that 
part of the land, or whether Israel is behaving justly. A religious Zionist may be inclined to 
offer religious arguments in favor of God’s having promised the land to the Jewish people, 
and these arguments will seem especially cogent if the religious Zionist’s interlocutor is at least 
committed to an overlapping, if not identical, theological framework. However, the possibility 
of divine reversal should worry the religious Zionist, because the possibility of reversal places 
a wedge between God’s purported promises and questions of rights and justice. The religious 
                                               
1 Of course, within Jewish tradition, such evidence is in fact defeasible and, if the debated proposition is one of 
halacha (Jewish law), possibly even irrelevant. See one of the most famous and foundational texts from the 
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 59a-b. 
2 Of course, it is also not a necessary condition, provided that there can be secular grounds for rightful 
possession of land. But this is less surprising than the sufficiency claim. 
 Zionist’s interlocutor may cogently say, “Perhaps God has indeed promised Eretz Yisrael to 
the Jewish people, but that in no ways guarantees even so much as rightful possession or 
justice here and now.” 
Now, I take no stand in this paper as to whether religious Zionism, political Zionism, 
some form of anti-Zionism, etc., is correct with respect to the Israel-Palestine conflict. That 
would not only be beyond the scope of this paper, but well beyond the scope of my own 
expertise. The point here is simply to emphasize that a prominent theme in the Hebrew 
Scriptures—divine reversal in the sense specified in the previous section—should give pause 
to anyone offering typical arguments in favor of religious Zionism. Intuitively, “with God on 
our side” we have nothing to worry about, but the possibility of divine reversal makes 
conceptual room for God’s being on our side—yet against us for the time being, because of 
what we have done. 
3.2 The Church, Gender, and Sexuality 
Some of the intra-Christian debate about gender and sexuality structurally resembles 
the debate about religious Zionism. Whatever one thinks about the plausibility of conservative 
Christian views on traditional gender norms and sexual life, it is natural to think that the central 
question about it for Christians is or would be over the factual question: does God really command 
a traditional sexual ethic? 
Divine reversal in the New Testament is presented in a different mode than in the 
Hebrew Scriptures.3 Whereas God’s relationship to human beings is largely presented via 
                                               
3 See Yoram Hazony, The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture. While I disagree with Hazony’s apparently hellenized 
(and, hence, apparently dejudaized) reading of the New Testament, I agree with his characterization of the 
Hebrew Scriptures as offering philosophical arguments in narrative form, and of the New Testament as 
something more in the genre of proclamation. 
 sweeping narratives in the Hebrew Scriptures, the New Testament relies much more heavily 
on explicit didactic teaching. 
To illustrate the concept of divine reversal as it might apply to the New Testament 
and contemporary debates around Christian views of gender and sexuality, it is useful to draw 
on a somewhat fraught comparison between how conservative Christians view LGBTQ 
individuals and how the religious leaders of Jesus’ day viewed tax collectors, prostitutes, and 
other “sinners”. Even suggesting a comparison between LGBTQ individuals, on the one hand, 
and the New Testament’s categories of sexual and other sinners, on the other, risks immediate 
offense. So, one must be careful to bear in mind the narrow purpose of the comparison. 
Remember that I am assuming for the sake of argument that the conservative position on 
contemporary issues of gender and sexuality is correct. My aim here is to develop a challenge 
that arises from within that perspective, just as my aim in the previous subsection was to 
develop a challenge that arises from within a religious Zionist perspective. The point here is 
not to say that LGBTQ individuals really are in the same category—morally, spiritually, or 
otherwise—as the New Testament’s various “sinners”. The point is that, from the standpoint of 
the conservative Christian position on gender and sexual ethics, the comparison would hold. 
So, from an intra-Christian point of view, it is natural to think that the central question 
for anyone wondering about the conservative Christian gender and sexual ethic is whether 
God really wills it. As with religious Zionism, the naturalness of this thought stems from the 
fact that if God really does will a conservative ethic, then this is morally significant for us here 
and now. As before, the moral significance seems obvious from reflection on God’s nature. If 
God is both omniscient and necessarily good, then if God approvingly wills that p, it would 
seem to follow that it would be good if p. Suppose you are arguing with someone over whether 
some gender self-identification or sexual choice is right for a person, and they demonstrate 
 that God has declared that it is not (perhaps by successfully beckoning God’s voice, or by 
producing a compelling passage from a text you both recognize as authoritative). As before, it 
seems that your opponent has produced very good evidence for their claim. 
But God’s favoring of a particular gender or sexual ethic does not settle the question 
of who is rightly related to God on this issue. With all of this in mind, consider the following 
pronouncement of Jesus, from the Gospel of Matthew: 
Truly I tell you, the tax collectors and the prostitutes are going into the kingdom of God ahead of you. 
For John came to you in the way of righteousness and you did not believe him, but the tax collectors 
and the prostitutes believed him; and even after you saw it, you did not change your minds and believe 
him (21:31-32). 
 
Jesus speaks these words to an audience that is presumed by the text to be on the right side of 
moral questions regarding tax collection and prostitution. In this case, it seems that what 
makes the difference is belief in the preaching of John the Baptist, not correctness on moral 
questions regarding tax collection and prostitution. But the general theme of surprising results 
with respect to who enters “the kingdom of heaven” is persistent in Jesus’ teaching. Notice 
that Jesus even accuses the religious leaders of positively blocking entrance into the Kingdom 
of God, despite their being correct on matters of doctrine and morals. In a passage form the 
Gospel of Matthew, these two statements are put virtually one after the other in the text: 
Jesus said to the crowds and to his disciples, “The scribes and the Pharisees sit on Moses’ seat; therefore, 
do whatever they teach you and follow it; but do not do as they do, for they do not practice what they 
teach. They tie up heavy burdens, hard to bear, and lay them on the shoulders of others; but they 
themselves are unwilling to lift a finger to move them. …  
“But woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For you lock people out of the kingdom of heaven. 
For you do not go in yourselves, and when others are going in, you stop them” (23:1-4, 13). 
 
Much can be said about these passages, of course, and the point of this paper is not to engage 
in New Testament exegesis. The point is to simply issue a kind of warning or challenge 
regarding the relationship between being right about some moral or other matters, on the one 
hand, and being in right relationship to God with respect to that issue, on the other. The New 
 Testament continues the theme in the Hebrew Scriptures of divine reversal when it comes to 
who is favored vis-à-vis moral questions, including those of gender and sexual ethics. 
Applying this to the case at hand, Christians should acknowledge that it can 
simultaneously be the case that the conservative Christian gender and sexual ethic is formally 
correct, yet it still be the case that the piety of those who follow the ethics is regarded by God 
as worthless, and that those who do not follow the ethic “are going into the Kingdom of God” 
before those who do. Moreover, a devout Christian should worry that holding to and even 
teaching the correct ethic is compatible with “lock[ing] people out of the kingdom of heaven.” 
This latter, haunting concept suggests that a person’s distance from God and God’s will may 
be attributable to someone other than themselves; indeed, it may be attributable to oppressions 
and burdens that they face precisely from those who are correct about God and God’s will! 
This has dramatic consequences for religious debates over gender and sexual ethics. 
Suppose two interlocutors are debating the question whether non-conforming gender 
identities are compatible with God’s will, or whether the Church oppresses people with non-
heterosexual sexual orientations. A conservative Christian may be inclined to offer religious 
arguments in favor of God’s willing a conservative ethic, and these arguments will seem 
especially cogent if the conservative Christian’s interlocutor is at least committed to an 
overlapping, if not identical, theological framework. However, the possibility of divine reversal 
should worry the conservative Christian, because the possibility of reversal places a wedge 
between God’s purported will and questions of gender and sexual obligations. The 
conservative Christian’s interlocutor may cogently say, “Perhaps God has indeed willed a 
conservative ethic, but that in no ways guarantees that those living and speaking according to 
the ethic are closer to God than those who are not.” 
 
 Now, I take no stand in this paper as to whether a conservative, liberal, or some other 
position is correct with respect to Christian approaches to gender and sexuality. The point 
here is simply to emphasize that a prominent theme in both the Hebrew Scriptures and New 
Testament should give pause to anyone offering typical arguments in favor of a conservative 
gender and sexual ethic. Intuitively, God’s will is an ethical trump card, but the possibility of 
divine reversal makes conceptual room for somehow holding all the right cards—yet, in the 
end, being on the losing end of the issue. 
§4 LESSONS FOR APPLIED ETHICS FROM A JEWISH-CHRISTIAN POINT OF 
VIEW 
 
It is natural for devout Jewish and Christian theists to think that debates in applied 
ethics are or would be settled by successful appeals to timeless divine commands. Although 
the traditional framework of divine command theory can justify this thought via God’s 
commands constituting what is good or right, one need not be a divine command theorist to 
have it. Even if God is not the origin or ground of moral truths, God’s goodness and 
knowledge guarantee that God’s commands and moral assertions are consistent with moral 
truth. If God wills some morally evaluable p, then it must be good that p. 
But the possibility of divine reversal means that someone may both be right that God 
wills that p yet wrong that those who are living and speaking in accordance with the truth that 
p are in that respect in right relation to God. Israel’s injustices sometimes made God reject 
their sacrifices—even though such sacrifices were offered in accordance with the Torah. The 
often-times impeccable piety of the religious leaders of Jesus’ day did not yield the prima facie 
appropriate hierarchies in the eyes of God. The first lesson to learn, then, is that correctness 
about doctrine and morals can be pulled apart from divine favor, even divine favor with 
respect to those very matters that one is correct about. 
  
A second lesson is that just as religious epistemology should be informed by a view of 
the purposes of knowledge, religious ethics should be informed by a view of the purposes of 
action.4 As many authors have pointed out, for example, a conservative Christian gender and 
sexual ethic is plausibly motivated by many underlying ends—faithfulness, imaging God, 
protecting children, and so on—that may nevertheless be harmed in a conservative context 
and pursued in a non-conservative context. It may very well be that, even if the conservative 
position is correct on these matters, its correctness is nevertheless not more important in 
practical situations than the values that undergird it. Hence, although it may seem paradoxical 
from the conservative point of view, God may in some contexts bless, sanctify, or otherwise 
favor what the conservative opposes. 
Third, more work needs to be done on what it means that God might command or 
promise something at time t, and then seem to temporarily reverse matters at time t+1. As 
another example of divine reversal, consider this peculiar proclamation from the prophet 
Jeremiah: 
[W]hen I freed your fathers from the land of Egypt, I did not speak with them or command them 
concerning burnt offerings or sacrifice. But this is what I commanded them: Do My bidding, that I may 
be your God and you may be My people; walk only in the way that I enjoin upon you, that it may go 
well with you (7:22-23). 
 
This passage is surprising, because God is said to have commanded burnt offerings and 
sacrifices at precisely the time in question.5 Nevertheless, it appears in the context of a familiar 
theme from the Hebrew Scriptures, that there is a hierarchy of divine ethical concern, with 
                                               
4 On how the purposes of religious knowledge should shape religious epistemology, see especially Paul Moser, 
The Elusive God. 
5 There is scholarly debate about whether this passage represents a separate textual/intellectual tradition from 
that which produced the text that clearly do involve burnt offerings and sacrifices at the time of the Exodus (cf. 
Leviticus 7:37-38). However, this would not explain why the compilers and editors of the Hebrew Scriptures 
maintained this text as-is. 
 justice, care for strangers, orphans, and widows, at the top, and concerns about sacrifices and 
cultic practices generally below those.6 
§5 OBJECTIONS AND CONCERNS 
But this still doesn’t bear on the truth—and isn’t that what debates over Zionism and Christian ethics are 
ultimately all about? 
 
First, that is not what these debates are all about. We should care about the truth, but 
we should also care about the fundamental values that undergird the importance of seeking 
the truth on any particular matter. For all I’ve said, at the end of the day, the conservative 
Jewish position on religious Zionism and the conservative Christian position on gender and 
sexual ethics could be true. But this is not a problem for anything I’ve said in this paper, 
because my point has been that the possibility of divine reversal should worry even those who 
have things right by their own lights. Second, the questions of this paper to some extent do 
bear on the truth. For instance, even if, in some ultimate sense, God wills a particular, narrow 
model of human gender or sexual life, it may be that, for the time being, God not only permits 
but sanctifies alternative models that serve the underlying values at issue. 
Both examples in this paper challenge positions favored by conservative wings of Judaism and Christianity, 
respectively. Do “liberals” in these traditions face these challenges equally? 
 
I see no reason why liberal Jews and Christians—provided that they are theistic 
realists—should not be equally concerned that being factually correct in their liberalism is 
insufficient for God’s really being on their side. Religious Zionism and conservative Christian 
perspectives on gender and sexuality just happen to be presently contentious topics where the 
issues of this paper arise in a direct and straightforward manner. For any debate where 
someone thinks that God is on their side, the chief lesson of this paper is that this does not 
                                               
6 Hence, when Jesus cites Hosea 6:6 (“I desire goodness, not sacrifice; obedience to God, rather than burn 
offerings”) at Matthew 9:13 to the same end, he is speaking squarely within the Jewish prophetic tradition. Cf. 
Yohanan ben Zakkai’s use of the passage in Avot of Rabbi Nathan, ch. 4. 
 settle the debate in their favor. If they are committing injustice, for example, in a way that 
directly implicates the debate, then devout Jews and Christians should see divine reversal as a 
real possibility. 
Divine reversals really just amount to conditional promises or commitments, typically in the context of covenant. 
When God promises the land to the Jewish people, for instance, the promise comes with conditions of behavior. 
 
 Even if translated into the languages of covenant and conditional promises, 
acknowledgement of the possibility of divine reversal would radically reshape debate on issues 
like the two discussed in §3. In a debate about possession of Eretz Yisrael, for instance, “God 
has promised this to me” is far more decisive than “God has promised this to me provided 
that I practice justice, care for the stranger, …”. So, I’m somewhat amenable to the 
incorporation of the ideas of this paper into the standard language of covenant and promise 
rather than the somewhat more idiosyncratic notion of divine reversal. 
 However, I’m still partial to the choice to conceptualize the phenomenon in terms of 
divine reversal. In a Jewish and Christian context, ethical debates have an upshot with respect 
to where and how one stands in relation to God and God’s will. The language of covenant 
and promise undersells the dramatic nature of one’s failure totally reversing one’s relationship 
to God. 
 
§6 CONCLUSION 
In summary, Jews and Christians seeking to engage in applied ethical debate in which 
reference to God’s will is fair game and, moreover, to do so in fidelity to a conception of God 
founded in traditional sources, must take seriously the fact that the prima facie warrant provided 
by even a successful appeal to God’s will may be defeated by one’s own failing to live in ways 
that reflect the values that undergird the very idea that one is right about. This fact is, or should 
 be, especially salient in cases where one stands in an oppressive relationship to those whose 
lives one is speaking about. 
